

## Message Text

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44

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMNR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T VIENNA 9994

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TACTICS ON STABILIZING MEASURES

REF: USNATO

1. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESENT PHASE OF ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES, WE SUGGEST THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES MAY WISH TO BEAR IN MIND FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS IN ISSUING GUIDANCE TO USNATO FOR DECEMBER 6 SFC DISCUSSION.

2. FROM VIEWPOINT OF US DEL, MOST IMPORTANT CURRENT TACTICAL OBJECTIVE IS TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF GRINGING SOVIETS TO BEGIN PHASE OF DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH THE TOPIC OF US-SOVIET  
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REDUCTIONS, WHICH IS THE MOST FAVORABLE POINT NOW EVIDENT FOR DEVELOPING THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LINES OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING PROGRAM. UNTIL THIS OBJECTIVE IS ACHIEVED, WE DO NOT WANT TO BE BLOCKED FROM TRYING TO OBTAIN

IT THROUGH A LONG DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES. IF THE ALLIES CAN MOVE STEP-BY-STEP TO ACHIEVE SOVIET AGREEMENT FIRST TO FOCUS DETAILED DISCUSSION ON US-SOVIET FORCES AND SECOND TO FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES, AND ARE THEN ABLE CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION BY SOME INITIAL DETAILED DISCUSSION OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS, THEY CAN THEN BRING INTO PLAY STABILIZING MEASURES AND THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN A FAVORABLE NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT. TO FOCUS ON THE SHORT-TERM TACTICAL OBJECTIVE DESCRIBED DOES NOT MEAN SWEEPING STABILIZATION MEASURES UNDER THE RUG TO DISAPPEAR IN A LAST MINUTE RUSH AFTER REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN AGREED. SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING IT WOULD ONLY MEAN THAT THE ALLIES HAD ESTABLISHED THEIR GENERAL APPROACH AS THE FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATION. NO AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN REACHED ON CONTENT. THE STAGE OF AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS OR ANY POINT OF SUBSTANCE WOULD STILL BE DISTANT.

3. WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, WE HOPE THAT DEPARTMENT CAN SUGGEST THAT USNATO:

A. SEEK TO ENSURE THAT THE CONCEPT OF PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS IS EXCLUDED FROM THE FORMULATION OF ANY GUIDANCE DRAFTED BY THE SPC FOR THE AD HOC GROUP FOR USE WITH THE EAST. THIS WOULD EXCLUDE UK PROPOSAL FOR AGREED DECLARATIONS LIMITING LEVEL OF EXERCISES.

B. TO ENSURE THAT THE FORMULATION TO BE ADVANCED TO THE EAST CONTAINS NO REPT NO INDICATION THAT SPECIFIC STABILIZING MEASURES

WOULD BE TABLED IN NEAR FUTURE;

C. SEEK TO ENSURE THAT THE FORMULATION TO BE PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST AT THIS TIME IS AS GENERAL AND ILLUSTRATIVE AS POSSIBLE.

4. ON THE LATTER POINT, WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS ISSUE HAS NOT YET FULLY RECEIVED THE RIGOROUS ANALYSIS IT NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, A MEASURE PROVIDING PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF ENTRY OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE REDUCTION AREA FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT STAND ON ITS OWN, BUT SHOULD LOGICALLY BE PART OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION DESCRIBING EXCEPTIONS TO AN ACCEPTED MANPOWER CEILING, EXCEPTIONS WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE PROVISION FOR REPLACEMENT AND EXERCISES. MOREOVER, WE ARE CONCERNED  
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THAT SUFFICIENT THOUGHT HAS NOT YET BEEN GIVEN TO REINFORCING THE ACCEPTABILITY TO THE EAST OF THOSE MEASURES WHICH WE CONSIDER MOST IMPORTANT. TO USE THE SAME EXAMPLE, A LIMITATION ON MOVEMENTS INTO THE AREA MIGHT BE MORE SALEABLE TO THE SOVIETS IF IT WERE DISCUSSED UNDER THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION HEADING AND INVOLVED A SOVIET INTEREST SUCH AS INTEREST IN REPLACEMENT OF DRAFTEES BY NEW RECRUITS THAN IF IT WERE PRESENTED UNDER THE GUISE OF A STABILIZING MEASURE. WE WOULD THEREFORE URGE THAT IF POSSIBLE ANY SPC DRAFTED GUIDANCE FOR USE WITH THE EAST TAKE THE FORM OF A GENERAL ILLUSTRATIVE SENTENCE RATHER THAN A LIST OF SPECIFIC MEASURES EACH OF WHICH THE ALLIES WILL THEN BE COMMITTED SUBSEQUENTLY TO ADVANCE TO THE EAST UNDER THE HEADING MENTIONED.

5. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO GAIN SPC AGREEMENT TO SUCH AN APPROACH THAN TO A LIST OF SPECIFIC MEASURES. AN EXAMPLE, INTENDED AS A SENTENCE TO BE INSERTED IN THE SECTION COVERING

ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN AN AD HOC GROUP PLENARY PRESENTATION NEXT WEEK, MIGHT BE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES: BEGIN TEXT: WE WILL AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSE MEASURES DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FOR GREATER PREDICTABILITY AS REGARDS MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO THE AREA AND FOR LIMITATIONS ON MAJOR EXERCISES, AS WELL AS OTHER MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF MISCALCULATION THROUGH AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND TO REDUCE THE FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK. END TEXT

6. WE ALSO HOPE THAT USNATO CAN POINT OUT TO THE ALLIES THE ADVANTAGES FOR THE ALLIED POSITION OF STARTING THE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES WITH THE EAST ONLY AFTER THE ALLIES HAVE SECURED THE IMPRTANT PRELIMINARY TACTICAL OBJECTIVE OF GAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE IDEA THAT INITIAL DISCUSSION WILL FOCUS ON US-SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

7. ONE MIGHT PUT THE CASE IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS: BEFORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF THE ALLIES FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WITH THE EAST BEGINS, THE ALLIES IN VIENNA SHOULD SEEK TO SECURE AN IMPORTANT PRELIMINARY TACTICAL OBJECTIVE WHICH IS A HIGHLY DESIRABLE PRE-CONDITION TO THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF THE ALLIES NEGOTIATING PROGRAM. THIS IS TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO RELINQUISH THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO BEGIN THE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS ON  
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THE BASIS OF THE ALLIED APPROACH. IF THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING THIS TACTICAL OBJECTIVE, A FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT BE CREATED FOR NEGOTIATING THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF THE AGREED ALLIED PROGRAM.

8. IF THE EAST CAN BE BROUGHT TO START THE PHASE OF SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN ON THE EASTERN CONCEPT THAT EUROPEAN FORCES AND NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES SHOULD BE INVOLVED FROM THE OUTSET, DISCUSSION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL INCLUDING STABILIZING MEASURES WOULD TAKE PLACE IN AN ADVANTAGEIOUS NEGOTIATING CONTEXT. SUCH A SEQUENCE WOULD ALSO PROVIDE MORE TIME FOR THE ALLIES TO DO THE CAREFUL WORK ON THE STABILIZING MEASURES AND THEIR DETAILS WHICH STILL REMAINS TO BE DONE, WITHOUT SUBORDINATING THE POSITION OF STABILIZING MEASURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING APPROACH. HUMES

NOTE BY OC/T: REFERENCE AS RECEIVED. SERVICE ON REQUEST.

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